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Paul is debating whether to press a button that ‘kills all psychopaths’. 
Surely it would be much better to live in a world without psychopaths, 
Paul reasons. However, at the same time Paul is quite confident that only 
a psychopath would press such a button. Paul prefers living in a world 
with psychopaths to dying. What should Paul do?
In this situation it seems irrational to press the button and rational to 
refrain from doing so: if Paul would press he would be a psychopath and 
hence die. 
However, in a recent paper Egan (2007) points out that the most 
sophisticated current version of decision theory, commonly called Causal 
Decision Theory, actually gives the irrational recommendation to press the 
psychopath button in this example. 
How can this be? Decision theory may be pursued with the aim of 
finding out how decisions ought to be made in order to maximize one’s 
utility.1 In the standard view, rational choice is defined as the process of 
determining what options are available and then choosing the most pre-
ferred one. Within the rational actor model, which is the standard for 
Rational Choice Theory (RCT), the substance of the rational action con-
cept is the maximization of individual utility. The individual can choose 
between alternative courses of action, taking into account individual 
preferences and states of nature. The rationality of a decision is evaluated 
by taking into account in what measure the results of the decision have 
succeeded in maximizing utility (that is, satisfying individual preferences) 
under some specific contextual constraints (states of nature).
There is an ongoing debate between two camps of decision theorists, 
namely, the proponents of Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and the 
proponents of Causal Decision Theory (CDT). The difference between 
the two decision theories consists in how they compute the relative value 
of actions. Roughly speaking, EDT says to do the thing you would be 
happiest to learn that you did, and CDT says to do the thing that is most 
likely to bring about the best results (Egan, 2007: 93). In this paper, I try 
to contribute to the debate between causal and evidential decision theo-
rists by solving the latest counterexamples that burden CDT by proposing 
a revisionist account. 
In part one I begin by briefly introducing Egan’s 2007 paper which 
shows that there are fatal problems to using both EDT and CDT for 
choosing rational options. Thereafter I spell out the Ratificationism Theo-
rem (RT). Ratificationism requires the chosen act, A, to have an estimated 
desirability at least as high as any of the alternative choices on the hypoth-
esis that one’s final decision will be to perform A (Jeffrey, 1983: 19).  I 
reconfirm that RT is not sufficient for solving all disputes between CDT 
and EDT. A problem with ratificationism is that in some cases there are 
no ratifiable options, but some options still seem rational. To solve this 
problem, Egan considers a lexical version of Ratificationism. The Lexical 
Ratificationism Theorem (LRT) recommends at least one option, even 
in cases where no option is ratifiable. I demonstrate, following Gupta, 
that also LRT can be refuted with a counterexample. In part two of the 
paper I proceed to develop an alternative ratificationist account, the Two-
Order Ratificationism Theorem (TORT). I show that TORT does give us 
the correct results to two recently posed (and still unresolved) counter-
examples to LRT. 
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PART I
1.1 Causal and Evidential Decision Theory
In recent philosophical debates the most prominent rival to CDT is 
EDT. EDT upholds that the best action is the one which, conditional 
on you having chosen it, gives you the best expected outcome. CDT 
maintains that the expected utility of actions should be unconditionally 
evaluated with respect to their potential consequences. CDT enjoins us 
to do whatever has the best expected outcome, holding fixed our initial 
views about the likely causal structure of the world (Egan, 2007: 94-96). 
In his 2007 paper Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory, 
Egan shows that there are fatal problems to both EDT and CDT. EDT 
argues for a policy of performing the action with the greatest eviden-
tial value, rather than the action with the best-expected causal upshot 
(2007: 93-96). CDT requires that the expected utility of an action is 
unconditionally evaluated with respect to its potential consequences 
(2007: 96-102). However, both EDT and CDT are mistaken in some 




It is rational to perform an action A, iff,
1.  A is ratifiable, and
2.  There is no other ratifiable option with greater VALCDT than A.
Option A is ratifiable if, and only if, there is no alternative B such that the 
value of B (VALCDT (B)) exceeds the value of A (VALCDT (A)) on the supposi-
tion that A is decided upon. Therefore, it is rational to decide upon an option 
A if, and only if, A is the only ratifiable option. 
Egan (2007: 107) promotes RT as a kind of adjusting principle; when-
ever basic CDT would get it wrong, RT should help to get to the right 
answer.
But it seems that RT is not useful for all cases. Let us go back to 
where we started our journey with, the example of the psychopath:
Paul is debating whether to press the ‘kill all psychopaths’ button. It 
would, he thinks, be much better to live in a world with no psychopaths. 
Unfortunately, Paul is quite confident that only a psychopath would 
press such a button. Paul prefers living in a world with psychopaths to 
dying.
I represent Paul’s choices below:
If Paul would press the button, he would be a psychopath and hence 
die. Pressing is the irrational thing to do since Paul prefers living to 
dying. In order to have an account of decision theory that gives us the 
utility-maximizing guidance on rational acts, we want our decision 
model to advise us to not press the psychopath button. 
CDT advises us to unconditionally evaluate the outcome. In this 
example, the fact that Paul is a psychopath (if he presses the button) is 
an unfortunate condition of pressing the button. But CDT does not take 
this condition into account and therefore encourages pressing the button. 
Also RT cannot help CDT from falling afoul, since neither refraining 
from pressing the button nor pressing the button is ratifiable. When Paul 
becomes convinced that he will choose to refrain, he will become quite 
confident that he is not a psychopath, and pressing will look better than 
refraining. Thus the option ‘not pressing’ is not ratifiable because there 
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is an alternative option, ‘pressing’, such that the value of that alternative 
option (VAL(PRESSING)) exceeds the value of the initial option (VAL(NOT-
PRESSING)), on the supposition that the initial option ‘not pressing’ is 
decided upon. The same holds for the option ‘pressing’. The moment 
that Paul becomes convinced that ‘pressing’ is the best option, the value 
of the option ‘not pressing’ (VAL(NOT-PRESSING)) exceeds the value of 
‘pressing’ (VAL(PRESSING)) since as soon as Paul becomes aware of the fact 
that he prefers to press, he might be a psychopath himself. So when Paul 
chooses to press, the value of not pressing will exceed the value of press-
ing since he has a good reason to think that he is actually a psychopath.3 
It seems that no option is ratifiable, and thus RT does not give us any 
helpful guideline in this example.4 
1.3 Egan’s Lexical Ratificationism Theorem
Since Paul is quite sensitive about dying, we have the obligation to fix 
this problem. To do so, Egan (2007: 111) considers an adaption of RT, 
LRT.
(LRT)
 It is rational to decide upon an option A iff,
1.  A is ratifiable, and there is no other ratifiable option with higher 
VALEDT  than A,5 or 
2.  There are no ratifiable options, and no other (unratifiable) option 
has higher VALEDT than A.
Option A is ratifiable if, and only if, there is no alternative B such that value 
of B (VALCDT (B)) exceeds the value of A (VALCDT (A)) on the supposition 
that A is decided upon. Therefore, it is rational to decide upon an option A 
if, and only if, A is the only ratifiable option. 
Step one advocates to order by ratifiability – that is, if A is ratifiable and 
B is unratifiable, then A is to be preferred over B. Step two advocates 
that within each of the two groups, we should order by VALEDT.6  Thus, 
it seems that LRT advances CDT by taking some elements from EDT 
for rational decision-making.   
LRT recommends at least one option even in cases where no option 
is ratifiable. For example, it yields the rational recommendation not to 
press the psychopath button. Step one is indecisive since we already saw 
that neither refraining from pressing the button nor pressing the button 
is ratifiable. In step two we refer to the EDT principle. EDT says that 
the rational action is the one such that your expected utility, conditional 
on you performing it, is greater than the expectations conditional on you 
performing any other action. So conditional on the fact that if you press 
you would be a psychopath, EDT prescribes not to press. And that seems 
to be the rational thing to do.
1.4 A refutation of the Lexical Ratificationism Theorem
LRT seemed the way to go until Gupta (Egan, 2007: 112) came up with 
a decisive counterexample of the Three-Option Smoking Lesion:7
Paul is deciding whether to smoke. Paul has three options: Smoke 
cigars, smoke cigarettes, or refrain from smoking altogether. Call 
these options CIGAR, CIGARETTE, and NO SMOKE. Due to the 
ways that various lesions tend to be distributed, it turns out that cigar 
smokers tend to be worse off than they would be if they were smoking 
cigarettes, but better off than they would be if they refrained from 
smoking altogether. Similarly, cigarette smokers tend to be worse off 
than they would be when smoking cigars, but better off than they 
would be when refraining from smoking altogether. Finally, non-
smokers tend to be best off refraining from smoking. 
Assume:
ȥ1 = smoking cigars
ȥ2 = smoking cigarettes
¬ȥ = not smoking
I represent the example formally in Table 1 below.
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ȥ: Smoker ¬ȥ: Non-smoker
VAL(ȥ1 ) > VAL(¬ȥ ) VAL(¬ȥ ) =VAL(ȥ1 )
VAL(ȥ2 ) > VAL(¬ȥ ) VAL(¬ȥ ) =VAL(ȥ2 )
VAL(ȥ1 _ȥ2 ) > VAL(ȥ2 _ȥ1 ) 
VAL(ȥ2 _ȥ1 ) > VAL(ȥ1 _ȥ2 )
Table 1: The values of the Three-Option Smoking Lesion 
Following LRT, step one tells Paul that there is one ratifiable option, not 
smoking (¬ȥ), and there are two unratifiable options (ȥ1 , ȥ2). Both ȥ1 and 
ȥ2 are unratifiable since smoking cigarettes is very good evidence that you 
would be better off smoking cigars and vice versa. Not smoking (¬ȥ), how-
ever, is ratifiable because it is good evidence that you would be best off not 
smoking. Thus, based on step one and two in LRT, Paul should not smoke. 
But this seems irrational: if Paul wants to smoke cigars or cigarettes, one 
thing Paul knows for sure is that not smoking is not the way to go.8  
Egan thinks that this example is fatal for LRT:
 ‘No ratificationist account will be able to deliver the right results in the 
sorts of three-option cases that Gupta has pointed out. The real importance 
of the Gupta cases is not that they refute lexical ratificationism— it’s that 
they refute every form of ratificationism’ (Egan, 2007: 113).
In Part II, I will prove that this is not true by providing an alter-
native account of LRT that does give the rational solution to Gupta’s 
counterexample. 
PART II
2.1 An adapted version of the Lexical Ratificationism Theorem
So let us look at what element in the Three-Option Smoking Lesion really 
causes the structural failure of LRT.
Paul has three options. Option ȥ1 is unratifiable because, conditional 
on choosing option ȥ1, option ȥ2 looks better than option ȥ1 – and the 
same applies to option ȥ2. Option ¬ȥ is ratifiable because, conditional on 
choosing option ¬ȥ, option ¬ȥ looks better than either ȥ1 or ȥ2. However, 
conditional on choosing either one of the options ȥ1 or ȥ2, option ¬ȥ 
looks very bad. What seems clearly irrational, for Paul, who finds himself 
deciding on either ȥ1 or ȥ2, is to perform action ¬ȥ on grounds of its rati-
fiability. What we need is an account that considers the fact that if Paul 
finds himself in a situation in which he wants to choose between ȥ1 and ȥ2, 
the ratifiability of option ¬ȥ does not hold as binding anymore. So con-
sidering Paul’s desire to smoke, option ȥ1 and ȥ2 should also be ratifiable.9 
From this line of thought it seems that we need to consider two sorts of rati-
fiability. To incorporate two sorts of ratifiability in the account, I develop 
the Two-Order Ratificationism Theorem version of CDT:
(TORT)
It is rational to decide upon an option A iff,
1.  A is first-order or second-order ratifiable and 
2. There are no other first-order or second-order ratifiable options with 
higher VALEDT than A, or
3. There are no ratifiable options, and no other (unratifiable) option has 
higher VALEDT than A.
An option A is first-order ratifiable if, and only if, there is no alternative B such 
that VALCDT (B) exceeds VALCDT (A) on the supposition that A is decided upon.
An option A is second-order ratifiable if, and only if, there is no other first-
order ratifiable alternative B such that VALCDT (B) (on the supposition that B is 
decided upon) exceeds VALCDT (A) (on the supposition that A is decided upon).10 
To demonstrate the above TORT principle, I will examine the Three-Option 
Smoking Lesion again. The option not to smoke (¬ȥ ) is obviously a first-order 
ratifiable option; there is no alternative (ȥ1 or ȥ2) such that the VALCDT (ȥ1 ) 
or VALCDT (ȥ2 ) exceeds the VALCDT (¬ȥ) on the supposition that Paul is a 
non-smoker (¬ȥ). Then we proceed by arguing that both option ȥ1 and 
option ȥ2 are second-order ratifiable. Option ȥ1 is a second-order ratifiable 
option since there is no other first-order ratifiable alternative (¬ȥ) such that 
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the VALCDT (¬ȥ) exceeds VALCDT (ȥ1) on the supposition that Paul chooses 
to smoke. Since Paul already decided to smoke, the value of ȥ1 exceeds the 
value of ¬ȥ in the example. The same applies to option ȥ2. So all options 
are either first-order or second-order ratifiable. Therefore Paul has to choose 
the ratifiable option that has the highest VALEDT. If ȥ1 or ȥ2 is ruled out in 
favor of ¬ȥ it is due to a higher VALEDT of ¬ȥ. Hence, unlike LRT, TORT 
does not rule out ȥ1 or ȥ2 in the Three-Option Smoking Lesion on grounds 
of ¬ȥ ‘s ratifiability, since all options are ratifiable. TORT recommends a 
rational choice in the Three-Option Smoking Lesion.
One could argue, however, that TORT is not really a pure ratifiability 
account. Since I introduce a second-order ratifibility, the content of the 
notion ratifibility changes, thereby changing its relation with rationality. 
However, one should notice that ratifiability does not necessarily imply 
rationality. In other words, not all ratifiable options are rational, even 
though all non-ratifiable options are irrational. What a ratifiability account 
should do is to rule out the irrational options for the agent. As Egan (2007: 
108) points out: ‘being unratifiable is sufficient for being ruled out as a 
rational option’. In the above case, Paul choosing not to smoke (¬ȥ) is not 
ruled out as an irrational option immediately. However, we cannot say it is 
rational either. What matters is that Paul should prefer smoking (ȥ1 or ȥ2) 
to non-smoking (¬ȥ) and that my TORT mechanism captures this.  Thus, 
according to Egan, ruling out the irrational options is all it takes to be a 
genuine ratifiability account. Since TORT does exactly that, the objection 
that TORT is not a genuine ratifiability account is not warranted.11
2.2 So can TORT also account for other examples? 
A possible objection to TORT could be that it is tailor-made to the specific 
example of the Three-Option Smoking Lesion. To refute this objection I 
provide two other examples where TORT is relevant. 
Firstly, TORT is also applicable to the first example of the Psycho-
path Button since it has the same relevant elements as LRT. Recall that the 
result of step one is indecisive since both pressing and not pressing are not 
first-order (or second-order) ratifiable. We skip step two since there are no 
first-order ratifiable options. In step three we decide to apply EDT, and so 
conditional on the fact that if Paul presses he has a great chance of being 
a psychopath, Paul does not press the button. And that again seems to be 
rational. 
Secondly, TORT is also applicable in another recent example of ‘Picking 
the Box’. Arntzenius presented Picking the Box in the paper of Gustafsson 
(2011: 149) in order to show how LRT can be refuted:
Paul is confronted with three boxes A, B, and C. However, Paul can only 
choose A or B in this first scenario. A perfect predictor has filled the boxes 
with money. If the predictor predicted that Paul will take A then he filled 
the boxes as follows: 2 euros in A, 1 euro in B, and nothing in C. If he 
predicted Paul will take B then he filled the boxes as follows: 4 euros in A, 
3 euros in B, and nothing in C.
See the corresponding Table 2 below.
Choosing A Choosing B
VAL(A)= 2 VAL(A)= 4
VAL(B)= 1 VAL(B)= 3
VAL(C)= 0 VAL(C)= 0
Table 2: Picking the box
It is rational for Paul to choose option B: he gets 3 euros instead of 2 euros, 
which is what he would get were he to choose option A. According to 
LRT, A is the only ratifiable option, and thus LRT would recommend the 
irrational option, namely A. Option B would be unratifiable because you 
would be better off choosing option A, on the supposition that B is cho-
sen. However, TORT would get it right. Choosing option A is first-order 
ratifiable. And option B is second-order ratifiable since the first-order rati-
fiable alternative (VAL(A) = 2 euros) does not exceed the value of option B 
(VAL(B) = 3 euros). Now both option A and B are ratifiable, so accordingly 
Paul should choose the option with the highest VALEDT, namely option B. 
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3. Conclusion
In this essay I have argued for a transformed version of the Lexical Ratifica-
tionism Theorem (LRT): the Two-Order Ratificationism Theorem (TORT). 
We have seen that in order to recommend rational decisions, versions of 
Ratifiability are often added to Causal Decision Theory (CDT). According 
to proponents of CDT, imposing a ratifiability requirement will help us to 
save CDT. The ratifiability requirement teaches us that it becomes rational 
to perform an action A if and only if A is ratifiable. Two of such accounts are 
present in the current literature, the (original) Ratification Theorem (RT) 
and LRT. However, Egan and Gupta (Egan, 2007) came up with decisive 
counterexamples which showed that ratifiability accounts of CDT some-
times recommend the irrational action. Yet, standard Evidential Decision 
Theory (EDT) will also not endorse the rational action. This is bad news 
to decision theorists. Therefore, I introduce a first and second-order form 
of ratifiability to CDT. TORT can accommodate the intuitively compel-
ling counterexamples to CDT that have recently been articulated by Egan 
(2007). By incorporating a second order, TORT is able to assess whether the 
first-order ratifiablity account is the rational action. With the introduction 
of TORT, I have proved that there is a ratificationist account that is able to 
deliver the right rational choice in the sort of three-option cases that Gupta 
has pointed out. 
The generalizability of my proposed TORT is yet to be tested. Above all, 
we should try to find counterexamples that prove my TORT to recommend 
the irrational decision. Or, we should try to find counterexamples that show 
TORT does not recommend the rational decision with the highest expected 
value for the agent. 
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Notes
1. We do not need to worry about which of the many possible interpretations of utility we 
should endorse here. For our present purposes, this question does not matter since it is clear 
from the examples and counterexamples which action or option is preferred.
2. The term ‘ratifiable’ resulted from Jeffrey’s idea that the agent can ratify a decision once 
it has been made. That is, his chosen action should have a maximal expected utility on the 
assumption that this is the action he is going to choose.
3. The term ratificationism was actually introduced by Jeffrey (1983: 19): ‘Ratificationism 
requires performance of the chosen act, A, to have at least as high an estimated desirability 
as any of the alternative performances on the hypothesis that one’s final decision will be 
to perform A’. But, to avoid confusion or different interpretations of the notion of ratifi-
cationism, I will only focus on the axiomatic notation of ratifiability conveyed by Egan.
4. This example shows us that imposing a ratifiability requirement will not help us to save 
CDT. It also shows that fans of EDT should take no comfort in the difficulties of this 
particular example against CDT. What we have here is definitely not an argument for a 
return to Evidential Decision Theory, since there are enough examples where EDT cannot 
be saved by RT either (Egan, 2007: 109-112).
5. One could argue that it is always better to have no guideline, than to have a wrong gui-
deline. At least RT principle that counts all unratifiable actions as irrational will not deliver 
the bad recommendation that we got from the original version of CDT. But according to 
Egan (2007: 108) this does not do enough. He argues for ‘completeness’ where the correct 
theory of rational decision will endorse the rational action. Obviously, RT does not fulfill 
this requirement.
6. Notice that LRT takes the VALEDT instead of the value of VALCDT, which is used in the 
original RT.
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7. One may wonder why this is called Lexical Ratificationism. As far as I know, this refers 
to the principle according to which entries in a dictionary are ordered, that is, the order 
depends on the first letter unless these are the same in which case it is the second which 
decides, and so on. I think this resembles the method where ratifiable actions are always 
to be preferred over unratifiable ones, but, within the categories, the action with greater 
VALEDT is to be preferred.
8. In the world of the Smoking Lesion, smoking is strongly correlated with lung cancer, 
but this correlation is understood to be the result of a common cause. There is a genetic 
lesion that tends to cause both smoking and cancer. The Smoking Lesion is an often used 
counterexample to both EDT and CDT.
9. I have not included a decision table for the Three-Option Smoking Lesion since such a 
table seems to be only more confusing. (Besides, a lot of spare paper was spilled finding out 
the right decision table). Instead, I think, a value table is more profitable for understanding 
the counterexample, so see table 1.
10. I have to admit that I do not find Gupta’s counterexample very compelling. It seems 
peculiar that you would be better off smoking cigars when you are actually smoking 
cigarettes, and the other way around. I think such an odd thought would not be rational 
in the first place. However, this is not the focus of my paper. What is important is that the 
option not to smoke is irrational and should never be endorsed by any decision theorem.
11. Or, as an attentive reader might point out, to make sure that no options – even not 
option ¬ȥ - are ratifiable. He might say that if we un-ratify option ¬ȥ, then we are at the 
same desirable point where we can treat all choices alike, and let the value according to 
EDT decide. But this is a mistake. Remember that all ratification mechanisms advance 
CDT. So, if there are no ratifiable options on the table, we have to make a decision accor-
ding to CDT. CDT would tell us not to smoke since non-smokers tend to be best off. And 
so, CDT does not take into account the conditionality that, if we are to decide between 
option ȥ1 or ȥ2, we are best off smoking.
12. Note that TORT is principally similar to LRT, except for the fact that it incorporates 
two orders of ratifiability.
13. Egan (2007: 108-109) gives two constraints for the adequacy of theory of rational 
decisions: soundness and completeness. A theory is sound if, when it’s irrational to perform 
X, the correct theory of rational decision will not endorse doing X. A theory is complete 
if it’s rational to perform X, the correct theory of rational decision will endorse doing X. 
My TORT mechanism satisfies both requirements. TORT advises Paul to smoke (which is 
a rational decision) and does not advice Paul not to smoke (which is irrational in the case 
of Paul to do).
References
Egan, A. (2007) ‘Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory’. In: The 
Philosophical Review 116(1), 93-114.
Gustafsson, J.E. (2011) ‘A Note in Defence of Ratificationism’. In: Erkenntnis 
75(1), 147-150.
Jeffrey, R.C. (1983) The Logic of Decision (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Joyce, J.M. (1999) The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Nozick, R. (1969) ‘Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice’. In: 
Nicholas Rescher (ed.) Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, 114–146. Dordrecht: 
Reidel.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported 
License. For more information, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/ 
